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CURRENT DECISIONS
of a trend that may culminate in the widespread judicial recognition
of this long-sought privilege.31 At the very least, Caldwell represents
a check upon the increasing practice of "convert[ing] news gatherers
into Department of Justice investigators. ... 32
ROBERT A. HOLMES
Constitutional Law-PRIVATE DISTRIBUTION OF OBSCENE MATERIAL.
United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).
A California couple placed a notice in a magazine announcing their
desire to hear from "other photo-collectors and liberal-minded couples."
Defendant Dellapia responded and correspondence, including an ex-
change of obscene films, ensued. One of the packages of film mailed
by Dellapia at the request of the couple was intercepted by postal in-
spectors. Dellapia was subsequently arrested by federal authorities and
convicted for sending obscene matter through the mail in violation of
the Comstock Act.1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
conviction, ruling that where there is no public distribution and when
children are not involved the government cannot constitutionally prose-
cute an individual for mailing obscene material to adults who have re-
quested it.2 The court concluded that the right to possess and receive
obscene matter established in Stanley v. Georgia3 would be mean-
31. Two cases dealing with this issue have recently been decided. In State v. Knops,
- Wis. -, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971), the court adopted the compelling need test as
enunciated in Caldwell, but found that a compelling need for the newsmen's testimony
did exist. In In re Pappas, - Mass. -, 266 NE.2d 297 (1971), the court criticized and re-
jected the Caldwell test stating that such a privilege seriously interferes with law en-
forcement.
32. 434 F.2d at 1086.
1. The Comstock Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964), declares in part that "[elvery ob-
scene ... article, matter, thing, device, or substance ... is declared to be non-mailable.
• .." It provides that "[w]hoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing . .. of
[non-mailable matter] ...shall be fined ...or ... imprisoned ...or both. .. :
See also, 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964). For commentary on a Supreme Court decision bearing
on the limitations of the Comstock Act see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 562 n.7
(1969). Cf. United States v. Book Bin, 39 U.SL.W. 4120 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1971); Public
Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 506-08 (1903); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727
(1877).
2. United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252, 1258-59 (2d Cir. 1970).
3. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See generally 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 261 (1969). During a
search of Stanley's home three rolls of obscene film were found. The Supreme Court of
Georgia upheld Stanley's conviction for violation of a Georgia obscenity statute, GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968), repealed, [1968] Ga. Acts 1249, 1346. Stanley v.
State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968). In reversing, on appeal, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that ". . . mere private possession of obscene matter cannot con-
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ingless without some corollary right to communicate or transmit
it.4
In Rotb v. United States5 the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Comstock Act," declaring that "obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." 7 It has con-
sistently reaffirmed this view in subsequent decisions.8 When faced in
Stanley v. Georgia with the question of mere private possession rather
than that of unlimited distribution, however, the Court found Rotb to
be inapplicable.9 Stanley declared that possession of obscene matter in
the privacy of one's own home is protected from state regulation.10
Discussing the scope of this decision, the Stanley Court espoused two
guidelines. First, it was careful to warn that Roth and its progeny were
not impaired by the decision." This statement implied that all forms of
distribution are subject to governmental regulation. Secondly, in dis-
tinguishing earlier cases, the Court explained that when widespread
public distribution of obscene material is involved, as it was in Roth,
there is always a danger that the material might fall into the hands of
children or intrude upon the sensibilities of an unwilling public. 12 In
stitutionally be made a crime.' 394 U.S. at 559. The Constitution also protects the
right to "receive" obscene matter. 394 U.S. at 564. Cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. 433 F.2d at 1258.
5. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
7. 354 U.S. at 485.
8. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
9. 394 U.S. at 560-64.
10. Id. at 559, 568.
11. "Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by today's holding.
As we have said, the states retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply
does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home."
Id. at 568.
12. The Supreme Court has found only two legitimate reasons for obscenity legisla-
tion; protecting children from exposure, and preventing intrusions on the sensibilities of
an unwilling public. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969). Preventing crimes
of sexual violence, and protecting the society's moral fabric were rejected by the
Supreme Court in Stanley and other decisions. See Note, The Newi Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, 57 CALip. L. REv. 1237, 1276 (1969). The argument that the gov-
ernment must restrict distribution to adults as a necessary concomitant to protecting
children was foreclosed by Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1956). In discussing the
argument that statutory schemes prohibiting possession are necessary to prevent distri-
bution, due to the evidenciary problem in proving intent to distribute, the Stanley
court said, "We are not convinced that such difficulties exist, but even if they did we
do not think that they would justify infringement of the individual's right to read or
observe what he pleases." 394 U.S. at 567-68.
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Stanley there was no such danger.13 The question logically follows,
then, whether the Stanley rationale can be extended beyond mere pos-
session to include private distribution when none of the enumerated
dangers are present. 4
Considerable variance has appeared in decisions relating to this prob-
lem. Most courts have restricted the decision to its facts and have not
departed from Roth.5 This construction allows an individual to exer-
cise his right to possess obscene matter, but only at the expense of crim-
inal acts on the part of a supplier.'6 Rejecting this view, a small number
of courts, in line with United States v. Dellapia, have extended the
Stanley rationale to allow private distribution when no countervailing
public interest is involved.' 7 This position is based primarily upon an
interpretation that Roth applies only where there is widespread public
distribution to an unwilling public or where children may be exposed to
the material.' 8 Restricted distribution of obscene matter, properly con-
trolled, is no longer to be condemned. 9 This conclusion is further
compelled by the logical inference that a constitutional right to receive
a communication would be meaningless without a coextensive right to
convey it.20
Support for this contention is found in Griswold v. Connecticut,21
13. Id. at 567.
14. See Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), appealed, 396 U.S.
976 (1969), prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 985 (1970), restored to calendar for rearg., 39
U.SL.W. 3006 (U.S. July 14, 1970) (No. 1149, 1969 Term, renumbered No. 83, 1970
Term).
15. See United States v. Fragus, 422 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Mel-
vin, 419 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Gower, 316 F. Supp. 1390 (Dl).C.
1970); A.B.C. Books Inc. v. Benson, 315 F. Supp. 695 (MD. Tenn. 1970); Newman v.
Conover, 313 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Grove Press, Inc. v. Brockett, 312 F. Supp.
496 (E.D. Wash. 1970); United States v. 35 MM Color Film, 312 F. Supp. 1382 (SD.N.Y.
1970); Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969); aff'd merz., 397 U.S. 592
(1970).
16. Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (D. Mass. 1969).
17. United States v. Reidel, - F. Supp. - (CD. Cal. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 91
S. Ct. 67 (1970); P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass. 1970), appeal dock-
eted, 39 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Aug. 11, 1970); United States v. Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421 (ED.
Cal. 1970); United States v. 37 Photos, 309 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Karalexis v.
Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), appealed, 396 U.S. 976 (1969), prob. juris.
noted, 397 U.S. 985 (1970), restored to calendar for rearg., 39 U.S.,.W. 3006 (U.S. July
14, 1970) (No. 1149, 1969 Term, renumbered No. 83, 1970 Term); Stein v. Batchelor,
300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
18. United States v. Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421, 423 (ED. Cal. 1970).
19. Id. See also cases cited note 17, supra.
20. United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252, 1258 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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in which the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a professional
counselor who had given information to married couples regarding the
use of contraceptives in violation of Connecticut law. The Court rea-
soned that a married couple's right to decide whether or not to receive
information and devices or to practice birth control is protected by an
implied constitutional right of privacy.2 2 Recognizing this right neces-
sarily implies that a state cannot be allowed to prohibit the dissemination
of information and devices which are essential to its existence.
The Dellapia court joins the growing minority of jurisdictions which
have extended Stanley beyond its facts.2- In its logical and narrowly
circumscribed extension, which provides a legitimate source for adult
material acquired for private enjoyment, however, the court recognizes
a concurrent governmental right to enforce statutory provisions that
protect a recognized public interest.
24
WOODROW TURNER, JR.
Evidence-NARCOTICS-QANTITY REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION OF POS-
SESSION. Robbsv. Cotmnonwvealth, 211 Va. 153, 176 S.E. 2d 429 (1970).
In September 1968, the defendant was convicted by a trial court,
sitting without a jury, of possession of heroin under section 54-488 of
the Virginia Code,' a part of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. On
appeal she contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her
conviction in that it failed to establish possession of a useable quantity
of the narcotic.
22. Although the right of privacy is not explicitly enumerated, it is within the
penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484.
23. For a thorough discussion of the logic of extending Stanley beyond its facts see
Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine Is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REv. 185,
229 (1969); Laughlin, A Requiem for Requiems: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Reality, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1389 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1, 147 (1969); Note, The New Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenities, 57 CALIF. L. REv.
1257, 1278, 1279 (1969); 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 503 (1969).
24. See note 12, supra.
1. 'It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his con-
trol, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense or compound any narcotic drug, except as
authorized in this article." This section, along with the rest of the Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act, was repealed by the General Assembly in April, 1970. It was replaced by
The Drug Control Act, ch. 650, [1970] Va. Acts. The corresponding language of the
new law is found in VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.101(c) (Supp. 1970): "It is unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled drug unless such sub-
stance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a prac-
titioner ... :
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